Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 3

Issue 4

2021

Lessons Learned: Jason Furman
Mercedes Cardona

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial
Management Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Policy History,
Theory, and Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
Cardona, Mercedes (2021) "Lessons Learned: Jason Furman," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 3 : Iss. 4,
25-27.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss4/2

This Lessons Learned is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Jason Furman
By Mercedes Cardona
Jason Furman was a top economic adviser to the successful presidential campaign of Barack
Obama in 2008. He played a key role in most of President Obama’s major economic policies
during and in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09. Furman, who had
served at both the Council of Economic Advisers and National Economic Council during the
Clinton administration, served as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from August
2013 to January 2017, acting as President Obama’s chief economist and a member of the
cabinet. He is currently professor of the practice of economic policy at the Harvard Kennedy
School and nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Furman.
Be aggressive early; politics will obstruct later.
Coming into office while the crisis was still in its critical phase, the Obama administration
started working on stimulus plans right after the election. The Bush administration had
acted “very quickly and very well” said Furman, but the crisis was much bigger than
initially anticipated. The Bush White House was not able to provide much guidance when, a
year later, the Obama team tried to put together a stimulus package five to ten times bigger
than the initial actions, he said. Luckily, the new Congress was overwhelmingly Democratic,
so it had already made progress on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act by the
time Obama was inaugurated later in January.
“Be as big and bold as you can be,” said Furman. “You’re never going to regret having done
too much.” Many of the policy responses to the 2007–09 crisis were unpopular in the crisis’
early stages, even if they were quite necessary to the economy’s resilience. Measures such
as the Troubled Assets Relief Program were tagged as “bailout” efforts for industries, and
after Obama signed the Recovery Act in February 2009, legislators grew reluctant to back
more stimulus measures.
“We pushed for more stimulus. We tried hard to get more stimulus and Congress wouldn’t
pass it,” said Furman.
No one thanked Obama for rescuing the economy. Much of what he did was not
popular. He knew that going into it. His focus was on doing what was right, not what
was popular. In some cases, it was popular to place more constraints on bailout
funds, but also it meant they would be less useful in rescuing the economy. And so,
there was a tension between those two.
Could we have done more popular things? Housing actually wasn’t that popular. A
lot of people reacted very negatively to helping homeowners, because they thought
it was helping undeserving homeowners and people whose fault it was. So, for many
people, we did too much for homeowners. For some people, we did too little.
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I don’t think there was any winning a popularity contest. I don’t think that’s what he
should have tried to do.
Unable to get Congress to approve additional comprehensive stimulus packages, such as
the American Jobs Act in 2011, the Obama administration took what Furman called an
“opportunistic” approach. It attached stimulus measures to every related piece of
legislation, such as adding state funds for education and healthcare, adding funds to a
Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization bill, and passing the Car Allowance Rebate
System (known as the Cash for Clunkers program) to replace old cars with fuel-efficient
models and stimulate car sales.
Spread the stimulus as widely as possible.
Even with insufficient fiscal stimulus, Furman noted, the U.S. emerged from this recession
faster than previous ones and faster than other countries that experienced the downturn.
He credits this in part to the broad approach that the Obama administration tried to take
with the stimulus:
I think there’s been pretty good academic evidence on some of the aspects of
stimulus, including unemployment insurance and Making Work Pay tax credit, the
tax incentives for businesses and some of the assistance to states. I think all of those
have done well in the evidence.
I think as a general matter, having a broader portfolio in your approach—partly
because you’re uncertain, partly because you have different needs—makes sense,
rather than deciding any one policy is the one right answer.
Going forward, I don’t think economists unfortunately have a great answer as to
what is the very best fiscal stimulus and what has the highest bang for the buck. But
I think we know that there’s a lot of different things to do, and it’s probably worth
doing a lot of the different ones.
Consider making stimulus measures local and permanent.
The Obama administration had to put aside some measures and table proposals that would
have made the economic safety net more durable and permanent, mainly because of
legislative opposition. For example, there were proposals for a series of fiscal measures
that would automatically trigger if the unemployment rate rose past a certain point and
extending some stimulus programs at the state and local level.
We had some interesting ideas that ended up on the cutting room [floor], that I think
are worth considering in the future. Perhaps my favorite was giving states money to
pay for them to cut their sales taxes to zero for a temporary period of time. The idea
being to encourage consumption and spending.
Those proposals would have been useful when dealing with the fallout from the COVID-19
pandemic, Furman said.
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I thought the CARES Act was very large, very timely. It showed that many of the
important lessons from 2009 were learned. It was not perfect. I would have done
things a bit differently.
But there were two incredibly important lessons that were not learned,
unfortunately, and as a result, the responses suffered. The first is that if you do
things at the federal level and you don’t help states, then states will contract and
undo some of what you did on the federal level. We have seen that happening.
The second is that it’s really important to make sure that you don’t just do the right
thing up front, but that you continue, and you stay at it as long as necessary. The
policy response, the CARES Act, is now over and it has not been replaced and that
hole is very costly.
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